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JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO EXCLUDE RELEVANT EVIDENCE
The judicial discretion to
exclude relevant
evidence: perspectives
from an Indian Evidence
Act jurisdiction
By Chen Siyuan*
Assistant Professor of Law, School of Law, Singapore Management
University
Abstract Stephen’s ground-breaking Indian Evidence Act contained ideas that
appear unfamiliar in the context of modern rules of evidence. Singapore is an
Indian Evidence Act jurisdiction which has retained those ideas, such as the
non-distinction between relevance and admissibility, the framing of
exclusionary rules in inclusionary terms, and the prohibition against relying on
common law developments inconsistent with the Evidence Act. These
peculiarities should have presented obstacles to the applicability of the
common law concept of the judicial discretion to exclude relevant evidence, but
this has not been the case. In this article, I first suggest why Singapore courts
might have been attracted to the concept, but I then highlight fundamental
uncertainties regarding the concept’s scope and normative justification. I
proceed to propose an alternative paradigm for Singapore, namely using
relevance and reliability as the only touchstones for admissibility of all evidence
in criminal proceedings. The various advantages of this paradigm are also
highlighted.
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1. Examining the exclusionary discretion in light of certain features of the
Indian Evidence Act
hen Sir James Fitzjames Stephen drafted the Indian Evidence Act of 1872
(which was supposed to be a complete formulation of English evidence
law at that point in time),1 he probably would not have imagined that
several jurisdictions which adopted his statute would still be using it almost 150
years later.2 Ground-breaking as it was,3 when viewed through the lens of contem-
porary evidence law developments in the common law world,4 Stephen’s Evidence
Act contains a number of peculiarities, and pertinent for present purposes are
three of them.
First, Stephen did not draw a distinction between relevance and admissibility;5
thus, what is found relevant under the statute’s relevancy provisions is admis-
sible, and the need to consider the difference between legal relevance and logical
relevance is obviated.6 Secondly, in an attempt to make the statute as uncompli-
cated as possible, Stephen wanted its relevancy provisions to be expressed in
inclusionary terms rather than exclusionary terms; thus, the exceptions to the
common law exclusionary rules (as they stood in the late 1800s) are directly
captured by the various inclusionary rules in the statute.7 This also obviates the
need to consider whether a piece of evidence that has fulfilled the criteria of the
(Indian Evidence Act) relevancy provisions in question can nevertheless be
excluded or deemed inadmissible by the court.8
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W
1 J. Pinsler, Evidence and the Litigation Process, 3rd edn (LexisNexis: Singapore, 2010) 18.
2 Ibid. at 19. Jurisdictions include Singapore (the main jurisdiction to be discussed here),
Bangladesh, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa and Sri Lanka. India still uses the
statute as well.
3 C. Tapper, Cross & Tapper on Evidence, 12th edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010) 73.
4 See Chin T. Y., ‘Remaking the Evidence Code: Search for Values’ (2009) 21 Singapore Academy of LJ
52 at 53: ‘A number of the 19th century rules (of the Indian Evidence Act) were shown to be based
on falsifiable psychological assumptions, dubious epistemic premises or outdated political or
social mores: these were modified, overruled or repealed not just by judicial decision alone but
also by legislation in [some] jurisdictions.’
5 Tapper, above n. 3 at 73.
6 Pinsler, above n. 1 at 56, R. Margolis, ‘The Concept of Relevance: In the Evidence Act and the
Modern View’ (1990) 11 Singapore LR 24 at 24–33, Singapore Law Reform Committee, Report of the
Law Reform Committee on Opinion Evidence (2011) 6–10. See also J. B. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on
Evidence at the Common Law (Little Brown: 1898) 265: ‘The law furnishes no test of relevancy. For this,
it tacitly refers to logic and general experience’. However, it has been said (Margolis at 32) that as
regards Stephen’s terminologies, ‘while purporting to be a concept of logical relevance the term
“relevant” means something much more restrictive than logically probative’.
7 Pinsler, above n. 1 at 38–9.
8 Tapper, above n. 3 at 73, Margolis, above n. 6 at 35–41. For a very useful flowchart of how admissi-
bility works in England, see P. Roberts and A. Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence, 2nd edn (Oxford
University Press: Oxford, 2010) 99.
Whereas the first two characteristics apply to most Indian Evidence Act jurisdic-
tions, the third peculiarity is probably confined to the Evidence Act of Singapore
(hereinafter ‘Evidence Act’ for disambiguation).9 The Evidence Act, enacted in
1893,10 states in s. 2(2):
All rules of evidence not contained in any written law, so far as such
rules are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act, are
repealed.
This peculiarity is unique to Singapore because most, if not all, Indian Evidence
Act jurisdictions repealed their equivalent of s. 2(2) quite early on.11 The literal
words of s. 2(2) present immediately apparent problems, chief of which is that
Singapore courts cannot rely on (the ever-changing) common law rules on
evidence unless those rules are consistent with the (essentially static) Evidence
Act. Unsurprisingly perhaps, the rigid s. 2(2) was virtually completely ignored or
glossed over by Singapore courts in evidence law decisions for more than a century
despite the precedence necessarily accorded to statutory law.12 With the passage of
time, the resultant unprincipled importation of common law concepts created
increasing contradictions between many provisions in the Evidence Act and
Singapore case law.13
One of the common law concepts that Singapore courts had, for a long time,
adopted without much restraint was the judicial discretion to exclude relevant
evidence. This is a common law concept of some vintage.14 In its most basic form,
the concept can be described as a court having the residual discretion in criminal
proceedings to exclude a piece of evidence if its prejudicial effect outweighs its
probative value; this discretion is residual because it is exercised even after the
piece of evidence has been deemed relevant (and in the context of the Evidence
Act, admissible),15 and this discretion can be exercised on the basis of a whole host
of reasons and normative justifications, depending on the jurisdiction in question
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9 Chapter 97, Revised Edition 1997.
10 Pinsler, above n. 1 at 18.
11 For instance, India itself repealed its equivalent of s. 2(2) in 1938: Margolis, above n. 6 at 26. What is
interesting though is that there is a view that the statute remains a ‘complete code’ in India and
therefore it ‘does not permit the importation of any principle of English Common Law relating to
evidence in criminal cases to the contrary’: V. R. Manohar (ed.), Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s The Law of
Evidence, 24th edn (LexisNexis: India, 2011) 2.
12 J. Pinsler, ‘Approaches to the Evidence Act: the Judicial Development of a Code’ (2002) 14 Singapore
Academy of LJ 365 at 366–77.
13 Ibid.
14 A. Keane, J. Griffiths and P. McKeown, The Modern Law of Evidence, 8th edn (Oxford University Press:
Oxford, 2010) 44–5.
15 Ibid. See also Muhammad bin Kadar v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 1205 at [146]–[147].
(some of which have implemented legislation to either curtail or expand the
discretion).16 The practice of Singapore courts arbitrarily adopting the concept of
exclusionary discretion without due consideration of the provisions in the
Evidence Act was always going to be a problem, particularly since the nature of the
discretion seems, on the face at least, fundamentally at odds with how relevancy
and admissibility were conceptualised by Stephen in the Evidence Act (see the first
two peculiarities above).17 There is also no proof that Stephen was cognisant of
anything akin to the concept of exclusionary discretion when he drafted the
Evidence Act.18 A commentator recently encapsulated the full range of the
problem as follows:
Although the common law has long recognised the propriety of a
residual discretion to exclude evidence, which, if admitted, would
cause the accused person to suffer injustice, the scope of this principle
has been tainted by uncertainty, repeatedly modified by the courts
and ultimately reformulated by legislation in England. In Singapore
… the courts seemed to have been satisfied in applying successive
common law developments concerning the scope of the discretion
without attempting to rationalise the governing principle in the
context of the Evidence Act …19
Then came the 2008 seminal decision of Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo
Phyllis, where the Chief Justice bucked the jurisprudential trend and declared that
in view of s. 2(2) of the Evidence Act, ‘new [common law] rules of evidence can be
given effect to only if they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the [Evidence
Act] or their underlying rationale’.20 Subsequent important cases by Singapore’s
apex court (Court of Appeal) have affirmed the importance of adhering to s. 2(2)
when modern common law rules of evidence are being considered.21 Evidence law
in Singapore was finally going to develop along a principled trajectory, but in Tan
Guat Neo Phyllis (which concerned a case of evidence allegedly obtained by
entrapment), the court also had the golden opportunity to clarify whether the
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16 See E. Tong, ‘Illegally Obtained Evidence and the Concept of Abuse of Process: A Possible Reconcil-
iation?’ (1994) 15 Singapore LR 97 at 100–17.
17 Pinsler, above n. 12 at 370–1, the dissent of Ambrose J in Cheng Swee Tiang v Public Prosecutor [1964]
MLJ 291. For an opposing view see Tan Y. L., ‘Sing a Song of Sang, a Pocketful of Woes?’ [1992]
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 365 at 413.
18 Tan, above n. 17 at 366–71.
19 J. Pinsler, ‘Whether a Singapore Court Has a Discretion to Exclude Evidence Admissible in Criminal
Proceedings’ (2010) 22 Singapore Academy of LJ 335 at 335.
20 [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 at [117].
21 See Lee Chez Kee v Public Prosecutor [2008] 3 SLR(R) 447 at [116], Muhammad bin Kadar v Public Prosecutor
[2011] 3 SLR 1205 at [51].
concept of exclusionary discretion was compatible with the Evidence Act; juris-
prudence prior to Tan Guat Neo Phyllis had effectively adopted indecipherable and
irreconcilable positions.22 After an extensive survey of the authorities, the court
made the broad conclusion that Singapore courts do possess the discretion to
exclude technically admissible evidence, if such evidence would result in obvious
injustice at the trial.23 This was a clear reference to (some variant of) the concept of
exclusionary discretion, but what was then obiter dictum in Tan Guat Neo Phyllis has
now become binding ratio decidendi following the subsequent seminal decision in
Muhammad bin Kadar.24 Muhammad bin Kadar will be explored in greater detail
below, but suffice to say for now that the Court of Appeal (citing Tan Guat Neo
Phyllis) held that if statements made by an accused to the police suffer from delib-
erate and serious procedural lapses, the court can exclude such otherwise
admissible evidence using its exclusionary discretion.25
2. Critiquing the exclusionary discretion in the context of Singapore’s law
on evidence
A. Overview of the critique
I disagree with the notion that the exclusionary discretion (as characterised in Tan
Guat Neo Phyllis and Muhammad bin Kadar) has been properly conceptualised and
applied in Singapore. In this article, I argue that the concept remains unclear as to
scope and operation; I also argue that there is still no satisfactory theory that
justifies its continued use. Further, in light of the peculiarities of the Evidence Act
as outlined above, I propose that the more principled approach in Singapore is to
use only relevance and reliability as the twin touchstones for admissibility of all
evidence; once evidence is deemed admissible, there should be no residual
discretion to exclude it for whatever reason. Indeed, a close and thorough exami-
nation of the Evidence Act will reveal that Stephen’s conception of relevance is
best understood as something that is rationally probative but undergirded by
considerations of reliability at the same time. I make the subsidiary point that if
there is some doubt concerning reliability,26 less weight can be attached to the
piece of evidence in question. This point is significant insofar as jury trials in
Singapore have been abolished;27 in other words, in any given trial, the fact-finder
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22 Pinsler, above n. 1 at 345–6.
23 Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) at [126].
24 Muhammad bin Kadar v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 1205 at [146]–[147].
25 Ibid. at [140]–[147]. The statements in question here were not covered by provisions in the Evidence
Act but by the Criminal Procedure Code 2010, below n. 29.
26 As will be explained, any doubts surrounding relevance must be resolved purely by the Evidence
Act.
27 See A. Phang, ‘Jury Trial in Singapore and Malaysia: the Unmaking of a Legal Institution’ (1983) 25
Malaya LR 50. The Evidence Act, however, was drafted with the jury system in mind.
(the judge) is exposed to all the evidence (probative, prejudicial, or by any other
name) right from the start.28 I go on to list the other advantages of the proposed
approach, but most crucially the proposed approach is consistent with the rules
and the spirit of the rules found in the Evidence Act,29 which, as already
highlighted, is something made mandatory by s. 2(2) of the Evidence Act.
B. Preliminary speculations concerning the attraction to the concept
Before proceeding to the critique proper, perhaps the most obvious and pressing
question at this point is, if indeed it is debatable that using the exclusionary
discretion is incompatible with the Evidence Act, why have Singapore courts, both
before and after Tan Guat Neo Phyllis, been so attracted to it?30 Apart from the fact
that the exclusionary discretion remains in popular usage in other common law
jurisdictions, a few speculative explanations may be tentatively suggested, with
the first two being interrelated. First, even though the Evidence Act contains provi-
sions that address (though obviously not perfectly because of its age)31 various
traditional common law exclusionary rules such as similar fact,32 character,33
opinion,34 and hearsay,35 there is a glaring loophole. To illustrate, a piece of
hearsay evidence is (theoretically) admissible only if it passes muster under the
exceptions in the Evidence Act to its hearsay provisions.36 However, it is actually
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28 See also Margolis, above n. 6 at 42; Roberts and Zuckerman, above n. 8 at 75: ‘judicial regulation of
the admissibility might be regarded as serving three core objectives … the jury is spared distraction
by trivial and unhelpful evidence … the judge is in a position to limit the scope of the jury’s
discretion to return questionable verdicts by excluding unreliable or unfairly prejudicial evidence
… function of rules of admissibility is to implement and reinforce the law’s intrinsic normative
commitments’. But with regard to jurisdictions operating without the jury system, see P. Murphy,
‘No Free Lunch, No Free Proof: The Indiscriminate Admission of Evidence is a Serious Flaw in
International Criminal Trials’ (2010) 8(2) Journal of International Criminal Justice 539 at 546: ‘trust is
reposed in the ability of professional judges to evaluate the weight of evidence, and to exclude
from their consideration irrelevant or unreliable evidence’. Indeed, the position in Singapore is
that judges are more competent than jurors to deal with the negative effects of prejudicial
evidence, and thus are able to assess all evidence objectively: see Wong Kim Poh v Public Prosecutor
[1992] 1 SLR(R) 13 at [14]; Tan Chee Kieng v Public Prosecutor [1994] 2 SLR(R) 577 at [8]; Tan Meng Jee v
Public Prosecutor [1996] SLR(R) 178 at [48].
29 As will be demonstrated below, the approach is also consistent with the rules and the spirit of the
rules in the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (Act 15 of 2010), the other statute that governs evidence
law in criminal proceedings.
30 Roberts and Zuckerman, above n. 8 at 29.
31 Pinsler, above n. 12 at 385.
32 Evidence Act, Chapter 97, Revised Edition 1997, ss. 14–15.
33 Ibid. ss. 54–57. Sections dealing with modes of proof are omitted here.
34 Ibid. ss. 47–53.
35 Ibid. ss. 6, 24–40. Sections dealing with modes of proof are omitted here. Sections 24, 25, 27–30
were repealed in 2010, but were relocated to the Criminal Procedure Code 2010.
36 As mentioned above n. 35, some provisions have been relocated to the Criminal Procedure Code
2010.
also possible that the same piece of hearsay evidence may be made admissible by
virtue of relevance defined broadly elsewhere in the Evidence Act.
This leads us to the second tentative explanation. For instance, as regards evidence
obtained by entrapment, the Evidence Act does not quite envisage such a situation
in the sense of expressly providing a rule to circumscribe its admissibility, and
there is no provision in other statutes that deal with (loosely speaking)
entrapment evidence either.37 On the contrary, the Evidence Act has a number of
provisions that arguably admit entrapment evidence readily. Two representative
examples may be found in ss. 9 and 11(b)38 (these two provisions come under the
banner of ‘general categories of relevant facts’):
Facts necessary to explain or introduce a fact in issue or relevant fact,
or which support or rebut an inference suggested by a fact in issue or
relevant fact, or which establish the identity of any thing or person
whose identity is relevant, or fix the time or place at which any fact in
issue or relevant fact happened or which show the relation of parties
by whom any such fact was transacted, are relevant in so far as they
are necessary for that purpose.
Facts not otherwise relevant are relevant if by themselves or in
connection with other facts they make the existence or non-existence
of any fact in issue or relevant fact highly probable or improbable.39
Conceivably, a lot of evidence can be found admissible under these provisions,40
including entrapment evidence.41 The scope of ss. 9 and 11(b) (or any provision
concerning general categories of relevant facts for the matter) is only
circumscribed by the fact that if a piece of evidence can be admitted via another
Evidence Act provision that codifies an exception to a common law exclusionary
rule,42 then that provision arguably has to be applied in conjunction with either
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37 Pinsler, above n. 1 at 346–55.
38 See also Tan, above n. 17 at 372; Evidence Act, s. 8(1) (‘Any fact is relevant which shows or
constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact’).
39 Pinsler, above n. 1 at 57–8.
40 See Chen S. Y., ‘Revisiting the Similar Fact Rule in Singapore’ [2011] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies
553 at 560. Indeed, s. 11(b) has been interpreted as setting out the actus reus requirement for the
similar fact rule: see Lee Kwang Peng v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 SLR(R) 569 at [44]–[46]. Unsurprisingly
perhaps, the correctness of this interpretation has been questioned: see Ho H. L., ‘An Introduction
to Similar Fact Evidence’ (1998) Singapore LR 166 at 190–1.
41 See Pinsler, above n. 1 at 56–7, Margolis, above n. 6 at 34.
42 That is, ss. 12–57 of the Evidence Act, which, together with ss. 5–11, belong to Part I: Relevancy of
Facts.
s. 9 or 11(b)43 (or any provision concerning ‘general categories of relevant facts’).44
This circumscription, however, does not apply to entrapment evidence, and one
may surmise that the discretion to exclude evidence has subconsciously become
the court’s residual gateway for admissibility (or more precisely, inadmissibility)
of entrapment evidence and indeed any other evidence that avoids the said
circumscription.45 As will be explained, things might possibly be less compli-
cated (and maybe more acceptable) if the use of the exclusionary discretion is
confined to common law exclusionary rules not covered by the Evidence Act, but
this is not the case. It is now settled law (certainly in Singapore) that the discretion
can be exercised in the context of all common law exclusionary rules and
executive improprieties (such as in Muhammad bin Kadar’s case, where the
accused’s statements were taken in deliberate breach of the statutory procedural
requirements).46
The third explanation is less tentative (and therefore less speculative), but the
reason for its plausibility is very recent. For years, it was wondered if Singapore
courts could take a cue from civil cases and justify their broad remedial powers
(such as invoking the exclusionary discretion) in criminal cases by pointing to an
exercise of their inherent powers.47 This broad line of reasoning only began to
pick up real momentum after Tan Guat Neo Phyllis,48 and was finally crystallised by
the Court of Appeal in Muhammad bin Kadar when it said that the exclusionary
discretion arises ‘from an inherent jurisdiction of the court to prevent injustice
at trial’.49 The argument from inherent jurisdiction is attractive insofar as it
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43 It is arguable because Singapore courts have not been consistent in interpreting the Evidence Act
this way: Pinsler, above n. 1 at 42–3.
44 Ibid. at 41–53, 57–8, 369: the other possible circumscription is that the Evidence Act only says what
evidence is admissible without mandating such evidence to be admitted. However, even if this is
accepted, this in and of itself does not provide a test to determine admissibility, which is the real
crux of the matter here.
45 If one were cynical, one might think that things have reached a stage (and indeed this was reached
some time ago) where it is no longer feasible to consult the Evidence Act when considering the
evidence—the statute is far too rigid, internally inconsistent, unwieldy, anachronistic, and
complicated to navigate and should therefore be ignored as much as possible.
46 Pinsler, above n. 1 at 359; Manohar (ed.), above n. 11 at 65–6; Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo
Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 at [76]; Public Prosecutor v Mas Swan bin Adnan [2010] SGHC 107 at [101]–[107];
R v Sang [1980] 1 AC 402 at 437–52. Such an expansive interpretation of the discretion can be found
in England’s Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, but Singapore does not have this statute.
47 See generally Goh Y. H., ‘The Jurisdiction to Reopen Criminal Cases: a Consideration of the
(Criminal) Statutory and Inherent Jurisdiction of the Singapore Court of Appeal’ [2008] Singapore
Journal of Legal Studies 395.
48 Pinsler, above n. 1 at 361–8.
49 Muhammad bin Kadar v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 1205 at [52].
possibly circumvents the s. 2(2) problem and provides a normative justification for
the exclusionary discretion (which will be addressed in greater detail in Part D
below), but several counterpoints come to mind. First, the argument effectively
presupposes that relevance under the Evidence Act does not amount to admissi-
bility, but this remains a contentious point.50 Secondly, extreme caution is always
urged in the exercise of a court’s remedial powers justified under the auspice of
inherent jurisdiction, in that the precondition is that the circumstances of the
case must be ‘exceptional’.51 Thirdly, such a constrictive requirement of ‘excep-
tional’ circumstances plainly does not square with the fact that, as mentioned,
the exclusionary discretion as presently conceived can be applied expansively in
the context of all common law exclusionary rules and executive improprieties,
whether captured by the Evidence Act or otherwise. Fourth, while it is probably
less controversial (but not without problems) to suggest that the court’s inherent
jurisdiction can be invoked to prevent an abuse of the judicial process so as to
preserve its moral legitimacy,52 Muhammad bin Kadar’s equating of inherent juris-
diction with the prevention of injustice is a substantially different and broader
idea, and may constitute going one step too far (in terms of expanding what is
supposed to be a narrow ambit of powers exercised pursuant to inherent juris-
diction).53 Fifthly, even if inherent jurisdiction is limited to the power to prevent
an abuse of process, there is reason to believe that power can actually be used to
remedy entrapment issues54—a paradox arises though, when one considers that
the defence of entrapment has been categorically rejected in Singapore. Finally,
it may well be that the argument from inherent jurisdiction is also compatible
with my proposed alternative approach, to which we now begin to turn,
beginning with the two main criticisms of the concept of exclusionary
discretion.
C. The first main problem of the concept: scope and operation of balancing
probative value and prejudicial effect
The concept of exclusionary discretion ultimately involves the balancing or
weighing of probative value and prejudicial effect. However, although this
balancing test has been around for decades, few attempts have been made to
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50 Pinsler, above n. 1 at 368–70.
51 Ibid. at 363.
52 See Tong, above n. 16 at 131–2, A. Ashworth, ‘What is Wrong with Entrapment?’ [1999] Singapore
Journal of Legal Studies 293 at 309.
53 See also Ashworth, above n. 52 at 314.
54 Ibid. at 315–17, S. Bronitt, ‘Sang is Dead, Loosely Speaking’ [2002] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 374
at 374.
properly delineate its scope and operation.55 Further difficulties arise when we
consider that, based on common law developments around the world, there are
virtually no limits as to the factual circumstances in which the balancing test
can be applied, and once the test has been applied by a trial court, the appellate
court has little room to interfere with the findings.56 Also, it has never been
clear as to whether ‘probative value’ refers to the contiguous concepts of logical
relevance, legal relevance, or even something else altogether (or whether it
factors in weight); academic opinions remain fundamentally divided, and
Singapore courts have been silent on this.57 Without resolving what probative
value entails, it is impossible to even begin the analysis, let alone apply the
balancing test. There is also no judicial explication or academic consensus on the
meaning of ‘prejudicial effect’: if a piece of evidence has prejudicial effect, does
it mean that it has prejudicial influence on the mind of the fact-finder out of
proportion to its true evidential value, that it unfairly colours the mind of the
fact-finder because it actually has no relevance whatsoever, or does it mean
something else altogether?58 Given that the Evidence Act contains no clear refer-
ences to either probative value or prejudicial effect, it is even more important to
be clear as to what the exclusionary discretion entails; indeed, without a
Singapore court even attempting to define what these terms mean, it should not
be lightly assumed (especially in light of s. 2(2)) that the exercise of the
exclusionary discretion is compatible with the Evidence Act.
In any event, apart from the definitional issues, the balancing test faces problems
in its conceptualisation and operation. For instance, in the context of the similar
fact rule, the relevant admissibility provisions are found in ss. 14–15 of the
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55 See Chen S. Y., ‘Dealing with Unreliable Evidence’, Singapore Law Watch Commentaries, Issue
1/August 2011 at 4. The genesis of the balancing test can probably be traced to R v Sang [1980] 1 AC
402, a decision certainly not bereft of criticism: see Tapper, above n. 3 at 202; Roberts and
Zuckerman, above n. 8 at 26–30, 74. Much of the Sang confusion in England has, however, been
clarified by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s. 78: Tapper, above n. 3 at 202–8. Section
78(1) states that in any criminal proceedings, ‘the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the
prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the
circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of
the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court
ought not to admit it’. English developments, of course, are also impacted by obligations under the
Human Rights Act 1998.
56 See Keane, Griffiths and McKeown, above n. 14 at 44–61.
57 See Margolis, above n. 6 at 29–32; Tan, above n. 17 at 372; Ho, above n. 40 at 167–71. See also Roberts
and Zuckerman, above n. 8 at 101–8.
58 See Tan, above n. 17 at 373–4; Chen, above n. 40 at 2–4; M. Hor, ‘Similar Fact Evidence in
Singapore: Probative Value, Prejudice and Politics’ [1999] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 48 at
50–1.
Evidence Act.59 However, these provisions60 cannot be said to accommodate readily
the balancing test.61 Even assuming, without conceding, that ss. 14–15 incorpo-
rates it, it is completely unclear whether one has to apply the balancing test in
conjunction with ss. 14–15, or as an alternative to it.62 Yet another question to be
considered is whether a piece of evidence that has some probative value must also
necessarily have some prejudicial effect, since both concepts can provide
outcomes independently. The probative value of a piece of evidence is, on one
theoretical view at least, objectively ascertainable and mostly immune from the
idiosyncrasies and biases of the fact-finder.63 A fact-finder’s estimation of the
probative value of a particular piece of evidence is thus supposed to be roughly
identical to another fact-finder’s. If probative value is taken to mean the proba-
bility of inferring guilt and prejudicial effect is taken to mean the probability of an
unwarranted inference of guilt, a piece of evidence that is unlikely to give rise to a
strong inference of guilt will have an equally limited prejudicial effect even if
admitted; conversely, a piece of evidence with high probative value increases the
risk of an unwarranted inference of guilt if the evidence is admitted.64 The
foregoing forms the theoretical construct; the likely reality, however, is that any
given piece of evidence will be perceived as having both low and high probative
value by different people at the same time.65 The inability to accord an objective
and immutable probative value to a piece of evidence will cause varying (unwar-
ranted) levels of prejudice.66 Accordingly, when evidence that should logically be
given low probative value is mistakenly perceived as having high probative value,
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59 Chen, above n. 40 at 5–7.
60 Section 14 states: ‘Facts showing the existence of any state of mind, such as intention, knowledge,
good faith, negligence, rashness, ill-will or good-will towards any particular person, or showing the
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evidence is so strikingly similar that to exclude it would affront common sense, the evidence
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(1985) 48 Malaya LR 29 at 36.
64 See McGovern v HM Advocate 1950 SLT 133 at 135 where it was ‘obvious’ to Lord Cooper that because
the evidence was strong, admission of that evidence ‘must to a substantial extent have prejudiced
the appellants in the minds of the jury’.
65 See generally D. Kaye and J. Koehler, ‘The Misquantification of Probative Value’ (2003) 27(6) Law and
Human Behavior 645.
66 T. Gibbons and A. Hutchinson, ‘The Practice and Theory of Evidence Law’ (1982) 2 International
Review of Law and Economics 119 at 123.
prejudicial effect in the form of the risk of an unwarranted inference of guilt
becomes more significant than it should be if the proper probative value was
given.
By way of a more concrete illustration, evidence of an accused’s criminal history is
generally inadmissible67 because it may ‘invoke the [inescapably] deep tendency of
human nature to punish’.68 Indeed, this human tendency conflicts with numerous
studies that have concluded that at least in respect of specific types of conduct, the
belief that past behaviour is indicative of future misconduct is likely false.69
Presumably there will be prejudicial effect if the trier of fact attaches more weight
to a piece of evidence than it deserves. This is perhaps what Lord Cross meant in
Boardman v Director of Public Prosecutions when he explained the substance of the
exclusionary discretion as ‘not that the law regards such evidence as inherently
irrelevant but because it is believed that if generally admitted, jurors would in
many cases think that it was more relevant than it was ... [such that] its prejudicial
effect would outweigh its probative value’.70 In theory, as explained, evidence with
high probative value will naturally result in greater prejudicial effect and vice
versa. Under this view, there is nothing to balance. Under the approach that
accounts for the reality of human behaviour, the balancing test is just as
incoherent. This is because prejudice only occurs when human behaviour results
in undeserved weight being attached to a piece of evidence.71 Yet, at the same time,
one can only determine if weight is attributed undeservedly after the probative
value has been factored in, as it cannot be said that there is undeserved emphasis
placed on the evidence without reference to its probative value. Ergo, the
balancing test is subsumed within the concept of prejudicial effect and it is
illogical to then balance prejudicial effect against the probative value of the
evidence a second time.72 All things considered, the weighing of the prejudicial
effect of a piece of evidence against its probative value is an exercise in
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(1988) 9 Singapore LR 103 at 105.
72 This was alluded to in Tan Meng Jee v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 178 at [50].
abstraction.73 Such high generality may have been deliberate so as not to unneces-
sarily fetter judicial discretion,74 but the practical result is the inability to provide
clear guidance to those subject to, or seeking to apply, the discretion in the first
place.75 There may well be no solution to the difficulties inherent76 in the
operation of the balancing test, but perhaps the time has come to evaluate alterna-
tives to the balancing test, at least in the context of Singapore; indeed, of equal
importance for our attention is the fact that there is still no consistent theory that
explains the fundamental basis for the exclusionary discretion.
D. The second main problem of the concept: unsatisfactory justificatory theories
Many theories abound as to what justifies the exclusionary discretion, but it
suffices to deal with just two for now (the justification of inherent jurisdiction of
the court having been dealt with above). The one perhaps most widely used is the
idea of fairness of trial.77 However, while the idea of fairness of trial may be
conceived to include broader, non-epistemic considerations such as rights
protection and the moral legitimacy of the criminal justice process, the cases seem
to define fairness of trial more narrowly.78 This was certainly so in Sang,79 the
highly influential House of Lords decision that gave a modern restatement of the
common law exclusionary discretion.80 Lord Diplock conceived a fair trial as neces-
sarily excluding information likely to influence the mind of the fact-finder that is
‘prejudicial to the accused [and] which is out of proportion to the true probative
value of that evidence’.81 For Lord Scarman, three principles were inherent in a fair
trial, one of which being ‘no man is to be convicted except upon the probative
effect of legally admissible evidence’.82 In the Canadian Supreme Court decision of
R v Harrer, McLachlin J stated that ‘judges have the power to exclude evidence
where its admission would render the trial unfair’.83 She explained that a ‘fair
trial’ is one that is neither the most advantageous trial for the accused nor the
perfect trial; a fair trial ‘is one that satisfies the public interest in getting at the
truth, while preserving basic procedural fairness to the accused’.84 In describing
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75 C. Tapper, ‘The Law of Evidence and the Rule of Law’ (2009) 68(1) Camb LJ 67 at 71.
76 Tan Meng Jee v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 178 at [51].
77 See Roberts and Zuckerman, above n. 8 at 74.
78 Ibid. at 75.
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375.
80 See Roberts and Zuckerman, above n. 8 at 74; Keane, Griffiths and McKeown, above n. 14 at 55; Tan,
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81 R v Sang [1980] 1 AC 402 at 436–7.
82 Ibid. at 455.
83 R v Harrer [1995] 3 SCR 562 at [41].
84 Ibid. at [45].
what ‘basic procedural fairness’ might entail, however, McLachlin J gave the
example of a piece of evidence that is obtained in a way such that its ‘potential for
misleading the trier of fact may outweigh such minimal value it might possess’.85
Seen in this light, McLachlin J’s proposition seems to be no different from Lord
Diplock and Lord Scarman in Sang, and indeed, both decisions essentially refer to
the balancing test (of probative value and prejudicial effect).86 However, it should
be noted that McLachlin J also pointed out that ‘Evidence may render a trial unfair
for a variety of reasons. The way in which it was taken may render it unreliable …
the police may have acted in such an abusive fashion that … the admission of the
evidence would irremediably taint the fairness of the trial itself’.87 Perhaps, then,
the justification for the exercise of exclusionary discretion, as in both Harrer and
Sang, is not so much open-ended concepts such as justice or fairness88 (or indeed,
‘basic procedural fairness’), but, at bottom, reliability (of the evidence).89
Turning to Singapore, as mentioned in Part B above, the Court of Appeal in
Muhammad bin Kadar said that exclusionary discretion can be justified by the
court’s inherent jurisdiction to prevent injustice at trial, and followed the Sang
proposition that the exclusionary discretion is ‘co-extensive’ with the duty of a
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86 Notably, Harrer cited Kuruma Kaniu v The Queen [1955] AC 197, a case that was also cited by the
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87 R v Harrer [1995] 3 SCR 562 at [46].
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of that evidence at trial, but does not necessarily do so’. See also Keane, Griffiths and McKeown,
above n. 14 at 58–60.
89 It is further submitted that considerations of reliability and fairness should not be seen as indistin-
guishable. As Roberts and Zuckerman (above n. 8 at 179) rightly point out, there are at least four
distinct rationales that can justify the exclusion of (relevant) evidence: reliability, rights
protection, deterrence, and moral integrity (of the verdict). However, in England at least, the
authors note that up until the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 was passed, rights protection
and moral integrity were not used to justify the exclusion of evidence (indeed, even after the
legislation was passed, it has not been justified consistently on the same rationales). In this regard,
insofar as Singapore does not have a similar statute, or at least insofar as Singapore’s Evidence Act
is quite a different piece of legislation motivated predominantly by considerations of relevance
and reliability (see below), it will be difficult to rely on jurisprudence and justifications that
emerge from the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
judge to ensure a fair trial.90 Thus it may appear that Muhammad bin Kadar justified
the exclusionary discretion solely on the basis of the need for a fair trial. Even
assuming this is true, this basis must nevertheless be limited to fairness that
centres its attention on the outcome of the trial, and not fairness of the entire
process of the trial (beginning with the investigations before the trial and ending
with the verdict). This must be so given the position established by Tan Guat Neo
Phyllis that although the court has the discretion to exclude admissible evidence
if this averts obvious injustice at trial, it may not have the discretion to
exclude improperly obtained evidence unless the circumstances are exceptional.91
Moreover, the Court of Appeal in Muhammad bin Kadar cautioned that ‘courts
should refrain from excluding evidence based only on facts indicating unfairness
in the way evidence was obtained’,92 and coupled with the court’s multiple refer-
ences to ‘reliability’ when justifying the exclusionary discretion (this will be
expounded in Part E below), perhaps the better view is to interpret the references
to fair trial in Muhammad bin Kadar as placing emphasis on ensuring a reliable
conviction (which was in effect the case in Sang and Harrer as well).93 Indeed, every
self-respecting court will always strive to ensure that fairness and/or justice
prevails; to say that the exclusionary discretion is justified on the basis of fairness
and/or justice is, with respect, not saying very much—or saying too much, if it is
accepted that powers exercised pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court
should be limited to preventing abuses of process specifically and not preventing
injustice generally.94
In view of cases such as Muhammad bin Kadar, what about another theory most
commonly invoked, the need to ensure minimum standards of law enforcement?95
This theory was, however, correctly rejected by Muhammad bin Kadar. Although the
Court of Appeal expressed the hope that with the exclusionary discretion power,
law enforcement officers would have less incentive to breach procedural
safeguards, it emphasised that courts should be ‘careful to avoid basing the
exercise of exclusionary discretion primarily on a desire to discipline the wrongful
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Leong Rayney v Law Society of Singapore [2006] 4 SLR(R) 934 at [64].
92 Muhammad bin Kadar v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 1205 at [68].
93 See also Tapper, above n. 3 at 196–7, where R v Sang [1980] 1 AC 402 was interpreted to distin-
guishing between ‘those in which the court is concerned to afford the accused a trial the outcome
of which is likely to be reliable, and those in which it is concerned to afford him fair treatment’.
94 For an opposing view, see Roberts and Zuckerman, above n. 8 at 179–91.
95 See A. Ashworth, ‘Excluding Evidence as Protecting Rights’ [1977] Crim LR 723 at 724; P. Mirfield,
Silence, Confessions and Improperly Obtained Evidence (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1997) 321; I. Dennis, The
Law of Evidence, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002) 24–8.
behaviour’ of law enforcement officers, including the prosecution.96 It can be
said, of course, that the judiciary has a duty to keep law enforcement officers in
check and to prevent the courts from abetting flagrant improprieties by the
police or to be perceived as instruments of illegalities (and this brings us back to
the point about inherent jurisdiction discussed above).97 Be that as it may, this
consideration cannot be flipped around to justify a deliberate decision to acquit
an accused even in the face of evidence with high probative value pointing
towards guilt. It should not be assumed that law enforcement officers will be
punished just because a guilty person escapes conviction as a result of proce-
dural impropriety on the part of the law enforcement officers. Such an
assumption rests on untenable premises. The first is that law enforcement
officers inevitably derive some satisfaction at obtaining a conviction of an
accused. The second is that upon being informed that it is their non-compliance
with procedural rules which resulted in the court’s decision to acquit an accused
who would otherwise have been convicted, the law enforcement officers would
suddenly strive to comply with procedural rules.98 As one commentator puts it,
‘we are punishing the public if we fail to convict the factually guilty by rendering
crucial evidence inadmissible; the police officer responsible does not suffer any
sanction at all’.99 Indeed, there are many other avenues which are more appro-
priate in resolving improper conduct, such as civil proceedings, prosecution of
miscreant law enforcement officers,100 and internal disciplinary proceedings.
These avenues may be more appropriate especially since in Singapore most, if not
all, procedural lapses are individual rather than systemic.101 Even if there were a
systemic culture of procedural impropriety, it is difficult to see the court’s role
and effectiveness in eradicating such a culture.102 Thus, except where expressly
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99 Duff, above n. 98 at 161. See also Roberts and Zuckerman, above n. 8 at 186: ‘if… it is sometimes
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from doing so on such occasions? Even with regard to those potential rights violations that we do
want to deter, moreover, it will often seem perverse to employ an exclusionary remedy in the
name of enhancing citizens’ freedom and security.’
100 This was suggested by the court in Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239
at [147] as a possible course of action against improper actions of police officers.
101 See generally Chen S. Y. and E. Chua, ‘Wrongful Convictions in Singapore: A General Survey of
Risk Factors’ (2010) 28 Singapore LR 98.
102 See also Roberts and Zuckerman, above n. 8 at 188: ‘All in all, the exclusionary rule appears to be
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required by statute,103 the court should not exclude evidence simply on the basis
that it is necessary to uphold minimum standards of law enforcement.
Muhammad bin Kadar’s confirmation that the law on criminal procedure and
evidence is not the proper tool to enforce disciplinary standards of police conduct
is correct.
E. The proposed approach of relevance and reliability as the twin touchstones for
admissibility and its advantages
As pointed out in Part D above, a careful reading of Muhammad bin Kadar will reveal
that while it clearly rejected minimum standards of law enforcement as the
predominant justification for the exclusionary discretion, it was less clear if it also
rejected fairness of trial as the predominant justification (especially since it said
that the court’s exclusionary discretion arises ‘from an inherent jurisdiction of
the court to prevent injustice at trial’).104 However, the Court of Appeal referred to
the idea of reliability at least nine times in the course of justifying the exercise of
its discretion to exclude the accused’s statements to the police, stating that the
recording of the statements suffered from serious and deliberate procedural
lapses.105 It may be helpful to reproduce some of the more pertinent extracts from
the judgment to illuminate the point:
[T]here is no reason why a discretion to exclude voluntary statements
from accused persons should not exist where the prejudicial effect of
the evidence exceeds its probative value … the very reliability of the
statement sought to be admitted is questionable ... This is already the
settled position under the [Evidence Act] …
[P]rocedural irregularities may be a cause for a finding that a state-
ment’s prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value … the rules …
for the recording of statements are … to provide a safeguard as to
reliability …
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104 Muhammad bin Kadar v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 1205 at [52].
105 Ibid. at [55]–[68].
[W]ritten statements taken by the police are often given more weight
by finders of fact as compared to most other kinds of evidence. This is
because formal statements taken by the police have the aura of
reliability …
Police investigators are aware when they record statements that they
are likely to be tendered as evidence before a court and there is
therefore an uncompromising need for accuracy and reliability … a
court should take a firm approach in considering its exercise of the
exclusionary discretion in relation to statements recorded by the
police in violation of the relevant [statutory] requirements …
[T]he breaches … [in the recording of the two statements] … are serious
enough to compromise in a material way [their] reliability … it is not
apparent to us that the probative value of the two statements can be
said to exceed the prejudicial effect of the statements against their
maker …
… both statements should have been found inadmissible under the
exclusionary discretion. The burden was on the Prosecution to
convince the court that the probative value of each of the two state-
ments, which had been compromised by the manifest irregularities
that took place when each of them was supposedly recorded, was
higher than their prejudicial effect …106
Indeed, apart from the far greater number of references to reliability,107 insofar
as the Court of Appeal also identified that the touchstones for admissibility
of evidence in criminal proceedings in Singapore are to be ‘materiality’ and
‘credibility’,108 it may reasonably be assumed that the court was in effect conceptual-
ising any notion of fairness (as opposed to rejecting fairness altogether) in terms of
the potential reliability/unreliability of the evidence, rather than something that is
broader, non-epistemic, or more normative.109 It is this assumption that forms the
foundation of my proposed approach: to use, as the Court of Appeal suggests,
relevance and reliability (since it should not be fanciful to assume that ‘materiality’
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and ‘credibility’ essentially correspond to ‘relevance’ and ‘reliability’ respectively) as
the twin and only touchstones for admissibility. However, to be clear, unlike
Muhammad bin Kadar, my proposed approach calls for a different framework for
admissibility: instead of using the balancing test (probative value versus prejudicial
effect) to determine if a piece of evidence should be admitted or excluded; instead of
asking whether there is any unfairness or injustice to be prevented; and instead of
calling upon the court’s residuary discretion and inherent powers to exclude
otherwise admissible evidence, the appropriate (and narrower) question to ask after
a piece of evidence is deemed relevant (as determined by the Evidence Act) is
whether that evidence is also reliable. The reliability of a piece of evidence will
depend on the facts of each case, with references to the requirements established by
statute (such as the Evidence Act and Criminal Procedure Code 2010110). In contrast,
the balancing test, in asking whether there is any unfairness or injustice to be
prevented and relying on the court’s residuary jurisdiction, will depend on vague
notions of prejudicial effect, unfairness or injustice conceptualised broadly, and the
hazy sense of when recourse to the court’s inherent jurisdiction is acceptable.
Under my proposed framework, once the threshold of reliability is satisfied, the
evidence is admissible—there is no residual discretion exercisable to deny admissi-
bility of the evidence.111 It is submitted that this approach is simpler and neater than
that applied in Muhammad bin Kadar. However, how does one reach the conclusion
that admissibility should be determined only with reference to relevance and
reliability?
As regards relevance, insofar as almost a third of the Evidence Act is devoted to
relevancy provisions, it is clear that relevance is one of the touchstones of admissi-
bility.112 While it remains debatable as to whether Stephen meant logical or legal
relevance (the evidence is unclear),113 it does not matter here because it does not
change the fact that for a piece of evidence to be admissible, it must satisfy the
relevant relevancy provisions of the Evidence Act (as opposed to some common
law conception of relevance). As regards reliability, it is by no means a novel idea
that it also forms a key foundation for the admissibility of evidence in criminal
proceedings. Indeed, Singapore courts routinely refer to reliability as the most
crucial consideration when admitting evidence.114 Reliability focuses the inquiry
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into the safeness of using the particular evidence in arriving at its verdict; if
ensuring that the right person is convicted is a fundamental objective of the
criminal justice system, it follows that reliability must be a touchstone for the
admissibility of evidence in criminal proceedings. But the reason why reliability
emerges alongside relevance as the touchstone for admissibility is that a close and
thorough examination of the Evidence Act will reveal that Stephen’s conception of
relevance is best understood as something that is rationally probative, but under-
girded by considerations of reliability at the same time. A sampling of some of the
Evidence Act’s provisions on specific categories of relevant facts (the exceptions to
common law exclusionary rules) would fortify the point. For instance, it has been
said that the statute’s hearsay provisions exist to guard against the ‘danger of
unreliability’ of evidence not directly perceived or given under a conflict of
interest,115 while its opinion provisions exist to guard against a witness’s
‘subjective reaction [that] may be unreliable’.116 But even if the consideration of
reliability resonates throughout the Evidence Act, how does this impact the appli-
cability of the exclusionary discretion? We need look no further than another
exclusionary rule—that of similar fact. As mentioned earlier, there are issues with
reading the balancing test of the exclusionary discretion into ss. 14–15 of the
Evidence Act. The Court of Appeal in Tan Meng Jee nevertheless considered the
balancing test to be embodied in ss. 14–15, but the problem is that it further held
that ‘similar fact evidence is always prejudicial ... in reality, what is “similar”
enough [to be admitted] is only so because its prejudicial effect has been
outweighed by the sheer probity of the similar fact evidence’.117 The better way
forward is to say that a similar fact only has requisite probative value, and is
therefore relevant, if it corresponds to the specific charge in question or demon-
strates specific modus operandi.118 Hence, as per the Evidence Act, the fact that a
person has the habit of shooting at people with intent to kill is irrelevant when
he is being tried for the murder of a specific person whereas the fact that he
has previously tried to shoot the same person is relevant.119 There is no need
to balance probative value and prejudicial effect and, indeed, it is illogical to
balance since similar fact evidence is inherently always prejudicial. Thus, if
relevance and reliability are accepted as the twin touchstones for admissibility, all
the court needs to consider is the similarity of the evidence to the charge. Only
evidence with ‘sheer probity’ would be relevant.120 Reliability becomes a relevant
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consideration if there is reason to question the veracity of the similar fact
evidence—for instance, where the evidence provided dates back a long time.
There are several other advantages in adopting the proposed approach. In
Singapore, criminal proceedings are also governed by the Criminal Procedure
Code 2010, which was a timely overhaul of its decades-old predecessor. Indeed,
there was a long, uncomfortable interface between the old Criminal Procedure
Code and the Evidence Act partly because of inconsistencies in how their provi-
sions were interpreted by Singapore courts.121 Besides being consistent with the
Evidence Act, the proposed approach has the benefit of being consistent with both
the rules and the spirit of the rules found in the Criminal Procedure Code 2010,
thus achieving interpretive parity between the two statutes. A representative
illustration of the rules of the Code is the established threshold of ‘inducement,
threat or promise’ that governs the voluntariness of an accused’s statements.122
This threshold is patently premised on reliability as a touchstone. Where an
accused’s free will has been sapped to the extent of causing him to make a
statement he would not otherwise have made, the reliability of his statement is
called into question and is excluded.123 Two other examples are the various proce-
dural preconditions that accompany hearsay evidence and an accused’s
statements to the authorities. As pointed out in Muhammad bin Kadar, the precon-
ditions in the Criminal Procedure Code exist to ensure reliability of the
evidence.124 As regards the spirit of the rules, although Singapore has been known
for its general preference for the crime control model over due process, there is
now a paradigm shift towards the latter.125 A key objective of the Criminal
Procedure Code 2010 is the establishment of truth (in contrast to exclusively
pursuing the objective of securing a conviction).126 Truth and reliability are inter-
dependent; truth can only be achieved if the premises needed to establish truth
are reliable.127 Thus, acknowledging reliability as a touchstone for admissibility
is consistent with the paradigm shift. As opined, ‘improvements to reliability
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126 M. Chng, ‘Modernising the Criminal Justice Framework: The Criminal Procedure Code 2010’
(2011) 23 Singapore Academy of LJ 23 at 41, 43.
127 C. Elgin, ‘True Enough’ in E. Sosa and E. Villanueva (eds.), Epistemology: Philosophical Issues
(Blackwell: Oxford, 2004) 114.
transform the crime control and due process objects of convicting the guilty and
acquitting the innocent into “two sides of the same coin”’.128
Another advantage of the proposed approach is that it may remove any lingering
uneasiness over potential double standards between entrapment evidence and
other types of improperly obtained evidence. In Tan Guat Neo Phyllis, the court held
that while improperly obtained evidence that is more prejudicial than probative
may be excluded, the probative value of entrapment evidence is by definition
‘greater than its prejudicial value in proving the guilt of the accused’.129 With
respect, this may be too wide a proposition, as entrapment may take various
forms.130 For instance, a significant distinction can be drawn between a police
operation that merely happens to facilitate the commission of an offence by a
recalcitrant offender (for that particular offence), and a deliberate police
operation that actively and indiscriminately procures the commission of an
offence by an otherwise law-abiding citizen who would not have committed the
offence but for the operation.131 Assuming that relevance is not an issue in both
scenarios, in the first, the problem is less well expressed as one of potential
prejudice than in terms of reliability (so that any conviction is safe and morally
defensible) because there were definite grounds to suspect that the accused would
eventually have committed the offence regardless of the operation. In contrast, in
the latter scenario, the evidence is unreliable because the accused was effectively
instigated by the state and the state alone into doing something he would
otherwise not have done. Accordingly, if the balancing test is replaced by an
inquiry into reliability, there is no need to engage in semantics to deny that there
is no prejudice to the accused, or that there is no unfairness to the accused, as it is
‘arguable that any form of impropriety involves unfairness to the accused if there
is a denial of rights’.132 The upshot of the proposed approach then is that it will be
quite meaningless (and indeed, inaccurate) to speak of a judicial discretion to
exclude evidence (whether using the balancing test or otherwise). Under the
proposed approach, a piece of evidence in criminal proceedings is either admis-
sible or inadmissible, based on the twin touchstones of relevance and reliability. It
is unnecessary and unhelpful (and inconsistent with the Evidence Act) to
introduce an extra dimension of discretion or excludability.133 Should a court be
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129 Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 at [125]–[126].
130 See generally Tapper, above n. 3 at 518–19, Bronitt, above n. 54. See also A. Roberts and D.
Ormerod, ‘The Trouble with Teixeira: Developing a Principled Approach to Entrapment’ (2002) 6
E&P 38.
131 See SM Summit Holdings v Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 SLR(R) 138 at [52]–[57].
132 Pinsler, above n. 1 at 349.
133 For an opposing view see Pinsler, above n. 1 at 369–70, Tan, above n. 17 at 413–14.
unsure as to the precise reliability of a piece of evidence, it can always admit the
evidence first and subsequently attach less weight to it if necessary. Attributing
various levels of weight to a piece of evidence is yet another mechanism to
improve the reliability and veracity of the evidence, and acts as a more useful
discretion for the judge than the balancing test:
[T]he balancing test must be considered a close relative of another
generalised approach that has emerged from judicial practice—that of
… according different weight or no weight at all to the different pieces
of evidence … This approach makes sense … because the court may
want to take into account as many facts as possible to be apprised of
the full picture... in Singapore’s system where there is only judge and
no jury, there is not much point in worrying that evidence is preju-
dicial because it may ‘taint’ the judge’s judgment in some way—the
judge will already have considered the evidence … that Singapore has
no jury system has also led the former Attorney-General, now current
Chief Justice, to comment at one point that the balancing test ‘should
have little or no relevance in bench trials as the judge can simply give
whatever weight is appropriate to the evidence’.134
The final advantage of the proposed approach is that it obviates the need for a
distinct test that applies to all the (so-called) exclusionary rules, because reliability
is capable of being a basis for the exclusionary rules (and any rule that curtails the
admissibility of evidence compromised by executive improprieties) as well as a
test in and of itself, and obviates any need for recourse to powers flowing from the
court’s inherent jurisdiction. The question that the fact-finder seeks to answer in
every case is simply ‘is the evidence relevant, and if so, is it reliable?’ It is impos-
sible to devise an all-encompassing test that will be applied in the same manner
regardless of the context. Such a test will invariably be highly general and hence
suffer from the same flaws as the balancing test. Instead, whether a piece of
evidence is reliable depends on the facts of the case. Thus, assuming relevance is
not in issue, the longstanding difficulties surrounding the classic hearsay cases
such as Ratten v The Queen,135 Walton v The Queen,136 and R v Kearley137 can be (and have
been) reconciled by asking whether the hearsay evidence could possibly have been
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fabricated or concocted—which is another way of asking if the evidence was
reliable.138 Taking procedurally irregular statements as another example, it is
impossible to establish rigid rules about what kind of police conduct is so flagrant
that it would immediately render evidence obtained unreliable.139 In each case, it
is not a question of the quantity or quality of irregularities, but whether the irreg-
ularities ‘materially affect’ the reliability of the statement.140 As previous cases
show, there is no difficulty in determining that the reliability of statements has
been materially affected. In Public Prosecutor v Mazlan bin Maidun,141 for instance, the
failure to obtain a signature in, and the failure to inform the maker of a statement
of his right against self-incrimination when making a cautioned statement respec-
tively, evidently did not undermine the reliability of the content of the statements
made.142 On the flipside, where the police officer recorded the accused’s statement
on a note and did not read the statement back to the accused or obtain his
signature, and later rewrote an expanded version of the statement and destroyed
the original note, the reliability of the expanded statement was clearly suspect
and the judge was right to consider the statement inadmissible.143 Similarly, the
procedural irregularities144 in Muhammad bin Kadar undoubtedly cast serious
doubts as to the reliability of the defendant’s statements to the police and resulted
in their inadmissibility. At any rate, in comparison to the balancing test, the
intuitiveness of reliability as both the test and basis for admissibility is simpler
and more attractive. Determining whether a particular piece of evidence is
reliable need not entail a rigorous arithmetic assessment of the probability of its
truth value. The objective is simply to determine if the evidence is sufficiently
reliable. Indeed, any potential subjectivity of this inquiry is circumscribed by the
fact that the Evidence Act already defines relevance in terms of reliability (and
logical probity). The second circumscription is that determining whether any
irregularities ‘materially affect’ the reliability of a piece of evidence is essentially
an objective one; the prescribed criterion may sound broad, but it is submitted
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that it is not any more likely than the balancing test to produce so-called arbitrary
outcomes. Finally, the attachment of more or less weight to any piece of evidence
that is suspect—and an accompanying explanation by the judge in his grounds of
decision—will ensure greater accountability and consistency in the fact-finding
process.
3. Concluding remarks
It seems necessary to conclude this piece by first briefly addressing what I think
will be the main and fundamental objection to my proposed approach. The
concept of a residuary judicial discretion to exclude relevant (and/or reliable)
evidence on some notion of justice is, in my view, ultimately motivated by an
impulse to protect both the rights of the accused and the integrity of the criminal
justice process. Indeed, such an impulse has been justified by various scholars on
non-epistemic and dignitarian grounds.145 In this regard, it may be said that there
are other aspects of the Evidence Act, hitherto unmentioned in this article, that
run contrary to such an impulse. For instance, local commentators have pointed
out that the Evidence Act contains provisions (not discussed in this piece) that
erode the accused’s fundamental right to the presumption of innocence,146 and
that key contemporary values such as procedural fairness, legitimacy in adjudi-
cation, and maximum individualisation are patently not captured by the rules of
the antiquated and largely stagnant statute.147 They argue that this makes the
Evidence Act look anachronistic and ripe for legislative overhaul; indeed,
Singapore may well be at a crossroads where it is on the verge of recalibrating its
rules of evidence in criminal proceedings.
Nonetheless my response to the aforementioned objection is that first, even
assuming, but not conceding, that the Evidence Act is disproportionately tilted
in the prosecution’s favour (or indeed, lacks due recognition to rights protection
and the moral legitimacy of the criminal justice process), in a democracy such
as Singapore only Parliament has the public mandate to either amend or repeal
the statute, and Parliament is arguably in a better position to strike the appro-
priate balance between the rights of the accused and the interests of the
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community.148 If anything, recent judicial149 and statutory150 developments (the
Criminal Procedure Code 2010 being one of them) suggest that Singapore is
increasingly placing an emphasis on reinforcing the integrity of the criminal
justice process generally and protecting the rights of an accused specifically.151 It
may thus not be long before the Evidence Act is reconceptualised along similar
lines, but until Parliament makes the necessary legislative change, the Evidence
Act is here to stay and should be interpreted according to its terms in the most
rational and consistent manner possible. Secondly, much as statutory fidelity is a
virtue and should be upheld to the maximum extent possible (not to mention that
it is also arguably a lesser evil as compared to ad hoc and piecemeal solutions by
the courts),152 the arguments I have raised against the concept of exclusionary
discretion and the arguments I have raised in support of my alternative
framework for admissibility do not emanate solely from fidelity to the Evidence
Act.
To recapitulate, under the current framework for admissibility in Singapore, a
piece of evidence in criminal proceedings is admissible if it is material or relevant.
However, the court retains the residual discretion to exclude such evidence in
certain situations, particularly when its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative
value, or when its admissibility would result in injustice at trial. As mentioned,
the use of such a discretion is ultimately motivated by moral considerations, and
such considerations should not be ignored. However, it is submitted that my
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proposed alternative framework for admissibility actually does not ignore such
considerations. In arriving at my framework, I started out by arguing that the
concept of exclusionary discretion is not as compatible with the Evidence Act as
the Singapore courts currently assume, before pointing out that in any event, the
concept suffers from various problems relating to its operation and normative
justifications. Under my proposed approach, a piece of evidence in criminal
proceedings is admissible only if it satisfies the twin touchstones of relevance (as
determined by the Evidence Act) and reliability (as determined by the facts of each
case, and where applicable, the rules in the Evidence Act and Criminal Procedure
Code 2010). The requirements of relevance and reliability form one check to
ensure that the rights of the accused and the integrity of the criminal justice
process are upheld; indeed, in the example of entrapment evidence, it actually
goes further than the balancing test in restricting the admissibility of such
evidence. Although there is no further discretion to exclude a piece of evidence
once it is deemed admissible (and not to mention that there are fundamental diffi-
culties in calling upon the court’s inherent powers to remedy any injustice), where
there is some doubt, unease, or sense of unfairness, the trial judge can always
attach less or very little weight to the piece of evidence in question and explain so
accordingly in the grounds of the judgment or oral verdict. This is the second
check to ensure that the rights of the accused and the integrity of the criminal
justice process are upheld, although it is necessarily premised on the assumption
that professionally trained trial judges in Singapore are well-equipped (or at least
better equipped than lay jurors) to determine questions of reliability and weight
in a way that is fairly consistent and non-arbitrary.153
All in all, it is humbly submitted that my proposed approach is the most
principled one insofar as it establishes the building blocks to the start of the
harmonisation of154 the tenor and rules of the Evidence Act, the Criminal
Procedure Code, and Singapore case law, while duly accounting for how the
fact-finding process in criminal proceedings in Singapore works.
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154 However, for an example of a local legislative trend seemingly militating against my proposed
approach, see the Ministry of Law’s proposed amendments to the Evidence Act to ‘broaden the
scope of the existing hearsay exceptions and introduce various new exceptions … To ensure that
these broadened/new hearsay exceptions are not abused, the courts will be given an overriding
discretion to exclude evidence in the interests of justice’: Public Consultation on Proposed
Amendments to the Evidence Act, <http://app2.mlaw.gov.sg/News/tabid/204/Default.aspx?
ItemId=579>, accessed 23 July 2012). On closer inspection, though, the phrase ‘courts will be given
an overriding discretion to exclude evidence’ actually suggests that the Evidence Act does not yet
provide for such a discretion.
